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SYMPOSIUM ON THE COLOMBIAN PEACE TALKS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
LEX PACIFICATORIA COLOMBIANA: 
COLOMBIA’S PEACE ACCORD IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Christine Bell* 
In this short piece, I open a conversation over how the Colombian Final Peace Accord provides evidence 
of, and a contribution to, a more general lex pacificatoria or “law of  the peacemakers” (lex pax for short).1 In 
light of  the Accord’s recent ballot defeat, I integrate into this assessment the merits of  using a referendum to 
approve (in Colombia’s case “affirm or deny”) the Agreement as a whole. Throughout, I draw on a peace 
agreement database which has coded over one thousand four hundred peace agreements since 1990 for 
comparative insight.2 
Lex Pacificatoria: A New Law of  the Peacemakers 
The practice of  negotiating ends to conflict within states can be understood as producing a lex pacificatoria 
or “law of  the peacemakers.”3 This lex pax arises from the attempt to fit the existing laws of  war or of  peace 
to the distinctive dilemmas that arise in transitions from conflict. These legal innovations clarify and extend 
existing international law as it applies to transitions. The lex pax is created by the interaction of  both state and 
nonstate actors involved in the transition process, who respond to legal norms and try to craft solutions that 
comply with them in creative ways so as to respond to the distinctive dilemmas of  peace-making. Other 
similar attempts to characterize the distinctive application of  law in times of  transition have argued that a new 
regime in the form of  a ius post bellum or “law of  the postconflict period,” is at play.4 In contrast, I have used 
the term lex pacificatoria that, like the concept of  lex mercatoria (law of  the merchants), suggests legal develop-
ments that have a more “intimated” existence rooted in a legalization of  practice rather than a coherent and 
distinctive new legal regime.5 The lex pax is not a new coherent distinctive legal regime, because that project is 
 
* Professor of  Constitutional Law and Assistant Principal (Global Justice) at the University of  Edinburgh Law School. This piece and the data under-
lying it have been supported by the Political Settlement Research Programme (PSRP) and is an output of  that programme. The programme is funded by the 
UK Department of  International Development (DFID), and data analysis was also supported by funding from UN Women. Nothing herein reflects the 
views of  DFID or UN Women who are not responsible for its content. 
Originally published online 03 November 2016. 
1 Christine Bell, Agreements: Their Nature and Legal Status, 100 AJIL 373 (2006); CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE 
AGREEMENTS AND THE LEX PACIFICATORIA (2008). 
2 PA-X: PEACE AGREEMENTS DATABASE (initial version of  provisions of  women, available at www..peaceagreements.org, full ver-
sion forthcoming 2017). 
3 Bell, supra note 1; BELL, supra note 1. 
4 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad bellum’, ‘just in bello’ . . . ‘just post bellum’?—Rethinking the Conception of  the Law of  Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 921 (2007). 
5 Cf. NEIL WALKER, INTIMATIONS OF GLOBAL LAW (2015). 
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neither desirable nor possible.6 Rather, the lex pax has a more intangible quality and involves state and 
nonstate actors adjusting their behavior to the expectations of  norms articulated by other international actors 
and domestic constituencies. They do so in ways that are given legal effect in peace agreement texts and, 
sometimes, later international standards and jurisprudence.   
From this perspective, the Colombian Peace Agreement and its eventual success or failure is of  global sig-
nificance to peace processes in the future, and even to new norm creation and application.   
Lex Pax Colombiana: The Colombian Peace Agreement in Comparative Perspective 
Length and Style of  the Agreement  
The Colombian Peace Agreement—the latest in a long line—at nearly three hundred pages long (297), is 
the longest peace agreement produced in intrastate conflict. As such it has only a few close comparators, 
notably the South Sudan/Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) at 245 pages. Past Colombian peace 
agreements with armed groups (up until the agreements of  this process) were at longest sixteen pages, re-
flecting agreements which focused on demobilization of  armed groups in exchange for resources, and 
commitments to enable the conversion of  armed combatants to political actors. They were limited in remit, 
although the process in the 1990s broadened by civil society, culminated in a detailed “peace agreement 
constitution” of  1991 which was 128 pages, and arguably forms the precursor to this peace agreement.   
The length of  the Colombian Agreement owes something to its negotiation style and process. Like the 
Sudanese Comprehensive Agreement, and the El Salvador Final Peace Accord (seventy pages), the final 
agreement brings together a series of  issue-by-issue agreements (themselves of  considerable detail), into a 
final unified comprehensive document which largely repeats the earlier documents but affirms them in final 
form. Like the Northern Irish peace process and the Ugandan peace process, the latest Colombian process 
between the government and the FARC moved forward on a “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” 
formula.   
This formula assists step-by-step agreement, which in this case has led successfully to a comprehensive 
agreement (although not, as we will see, to a successful referendum outcome). However, it also risks a long 
process with a lot of  agreements that can fail at the final stage as happened in Uganda in the mid-2000s, 
where the Lord’s Resistance Army initialed a series of  issue-by-issue agreements which would have largely 
addressed and resolved the conflict with the Ugandan government, but then disappeared without signing any 
final overarching version. Reaching a final accord as Colombia did, whatever happened thereafter, remains a 
significant achievement. 
New Colombian Lex Pax Contribution: The “Slow Drip” Peace Process?   
Depending on its eventual success, there are several different ways in which the Colombian peace process 
(or peace processes) may come to be understood as historically significant, both within Colombia and as a 
contribution to a wider global peace-making practice. Colombia may be viewed as having developed a new 
type of  “slow drip” process, where peace processes with particular armed groups, characterized at best as 
partial successes, can over time add up through gradual persistence and many stops, starts, phases, and muta-
tions, to something approaching a comprehensive national political settlement. Whereas in the past the partial 
nature of  these agreements seemed to dampen some conflicts and exacerbate others, their flaws can now also 
 
6 Christine Bell, Of  Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria: What’s in a Name?, in JUST POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE 
FOUNDATIONS 181 (Jens Iverson et al. eds, 2014). 
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perhaps be understood to always inform the next stage of  the process with regard to what a fuller peace 
would require. The referendum’s failure to garner sufficient support is a serious blow.  However, given that 
the anti peace-agreement vote appears to have emanated from areas in which opposed right-wing or paramili-
tary communities were strong, also looks a little like “more of  the same”7: yet another reaction and counter-
reaction in a government-nonstate actor process developed through cumulative distinct processes with differ-
ent nonstate actors which will now have to be addressed and hopefully extended, through other bilateral 
negotiations, in an ongoing “slow drip” dynamic that requires persistence.  
A more pessimistic view of  the peace process of  course can be presented. This would suggest that the 
process might also be viewed as just one more failure in a peace process trajectory which reached a high 
moment in 1991, and then went on an almost twenty-five year detour, before finding a way to incorporate the 
FARC, and which must still struggle to find a way to incorporate all the relevant armed and nonarmed actors 
in one overarching political settlement. And perhaps multiple incremental peace processes which never track 
smoothly forward, can always be read as both exercises which enabled ultimate agreement, and unfortunate 
detours. The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement of  1998 was described as “Sunningdale for slow learners” in 
reference to a failed peace agreement in the early 1970s (which if  it had been successful would have avoided 
thirty years of  conflict).8 Indeed most peace processes when viewed over a long duration have had many 
different peace initiatives and “peace processes” and have had to find a way back from setbacks. Unlike other 
contracts, when the peace agreement “contract” fails, it is not possible to simply walk away from the relation-
ship or look for solutions to be imposed by a third party. At some point the parties have to come back and 
renegotiate the contract if  the conflict is to be ended.   
Participation and Breadth  
The length of  the Agreement may also be linked to its modes of  participation and the breadth of  issues 
which the Agreement addressed as a result. Like the Colombian Constitutional process in 1991—this process 
has been innovative in its mechanisms and breadth of  participation.9 Notably, inclusion was enabled by the 
Gender Subcommission and the range of  international and domestic actors that engaged in the Havana 
negotiations. The breadth of  participation has been matched by the breadth of  coverage of  issues and the 
detail in which they have been addressed. Agreement by agreement, the process has dealt with: comprehen-
sive rural reform, political participation, illicit crops, victims and conflict termination, and a procedural issue 
dealing with implementation modalities. Some innovations deserve particular mention: 
(1) Illicit crops and drugs: the Colombian Final Accord includes a detailed agreement on drugs 
which breaks new ground in addressing organized criminality in a peace agreement. This is some-
what of  a new development in peace agreements, but not entirely so. Earlier Colombian peace 
agreements (1999) had addressed the issue, as have several interstate peace agreements, notably: 
Agreements in Afghanistan (2002-2012), the Malvinas/Falkland Islands agreements between the 
United Kingdom and Argentina, an Armenia Turkish agreement (2009), an Israeli Jordanian 
agreement and Israel-Palestine agreement (1994), and ceasefire agreements between the govern-
ment and ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar (2011-12).   
 
7 Redacción de El Pais, ¿Por qué el centro del país voto No, pero Cali y el Valle se fueron por el Sí?, EL PAÍS (Colom., Oct. 3, 2016). 
8 On This Day, 9 December 1973: Sunningdale Agreement signed, BBC.  
9 Kristian Herbolzheimer, Innovations in the Colombian peace process, NOREF REPORT (June 2016).  
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(2) Women and diversity: the Colombian process leading to the Final Peace Accord was notable—
both with respect to earlier Colombian processes and with reference to processes globally—for the 
comprehensive way in which it addressed women,10 although arguments have been made that this 
provision galvanized church opposition to the referendum.11  
(3) Sexual orientation: The Colombian Final Accord, like its earlier Participatión Política precursor, has 
what is arguably the first substantive provision of  any peace accord on sexual orientation. While 
other past accords have referenced issues of  sexual orientation some of  these references have 
been negative (for example, a banning of  same sex marriage in the “peace agreement constitu-
tions” in Burundi (2005), Democratic Republic of  Congo (2003), and Zimbabwe (2013)). The only 
other clearly positive reference was included in the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for 
Human Rights and International Humanitarian law between the Government of  the Republic of  
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front of  the Philippines (1998)—where “sexual 
preference” was included in an equal rights provision. While notable, not least for how early it was, 
it falls far short of  the Colombian treatment.12  
(4) Dealing with the past: The Colombian Accord has the longest provision on dealing with the past 
of  any peace agreement, with a complicated and elaborate mechanism. It is interesting to note the 
contrast between the sixty-three page victims agreement, and the five and a half  line provision on 
amnesty in the South African “peace agreement” Interim Constitution (1993), which provided the 
basis for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Colombian detail reflects: an attempt to 
work within the shadow the International Criminal Court; the complexity of  past mechanisms 
agreed in other past processes with other armed groups, with which this process had to be 
squared; and the complex business of  reconciling victims’ needs and the demands of  the respec-
tive parties to the accord.13  
The Final Accord’s Legal Status and Enforceability Mechanisms   
The Agreement is also innovative in its attempts to provide for its own legal status and enforceability. En-
forceability in any agreement is dealt with through a number of  different techniques, many of  which are used 
here, but at times with innovative Colombian twists and turns.   
(1) A referendum for the Agreement as a whole: Referenda on peace agreements or to bring in 
“peace agreement constitutions” are a mechanism (but only one) for trying to widen the legitimacy 
of  an agreement beyond the “elite deal” of  the parties to the conflict. This is intended to both 
bind the parties to their commitments by linking them to a wider social contract, but also to bind 
in that wider society and constrain would-be “spoilers” of  the deal. Referenda have been used in 
the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Indonesia/East Timor, Iraq, Northern Ireland, and Somalia. 
The Northern Ireland Agreement was probably most similar in involving an agreement to endorse 
 
10 See Lina M. Céspedes-Báez, Gender Panic and the Failure of  a Peace Agreement, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 183 (2016). 
11 Id., see also new joint communication between FARC and Christian groups, on gender, FARC y grupos cristianos llegan a puntos 
comunes sobre enfoque de género, SEMANA (Oct. 29, 2016).  
12 But see, Roxanne Krystalli & Kimberly Theidon, Here’s how attention to gender affected Colombia’s peace process, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 
2016), for arguments that these provisions connected to the referendum “No” campaign. 
13 See Nelson Camilo Sanchez Leon, Could the Colombian Peace Accord trigger an ICC investigation on Colombia?, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 172 
(2016); Juana Inés Acosta-López, The Inter-American Human Rights System and the Colombian peace: Redefining the fight against impunity, 110 
AJIL UNBOUND 178 (2016). 
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or reject the peace agreement itself. Referenda on complex political arrangements that involve 
packages rather than clear “Yes” or “No” propositions are notoriously high risk.14 Historically, an 
important and similar referendum on the transitional constitution in Spain (1978) enabled the tran-
sition but raised enduring controversy because of  its lack of  support by Basque and Catalan 
separatists. The Colombian process provided for a simple majority of  votes for the referendum to 
be carried.15 The victory of  the “No” vote, however, has now posed a challenge to implementa-
tion, as I address further below.  
(2) Attempts to fashion legal status for the Agreement: Achieving some form of  “binding” status 
for a peace agreement is often a tricky issue in peace processes.16 State and nonstate armed forces 
are often imbalanced in terms of  the risk each must take on committing to a final accord: while 
the armed group commits to end violence permanently, the state retains its monopoly on the use 
of  lethal force, and it alone has the ability to ensure that legal and constitutional commitments are 
implemented. For that reason, and also often for reasons of  status, nonstate armed actors in par-
ticular often want a form of  legal status for the peace agreement. In Colombia this was resolved by 
an interesting approach with a peculiar Colombian “twist.” The Agreement itself  is explicitly stat-
ed to be an agreement under Common Article 3 of  the Geneva Conventions, 1949.17 This move is 
not without international precedent: an agreement in Aceh was similarly stated to be a Special 
Agreement for the purposes of  humanitarian law, and the Guatemalan Comprehensive Agreement 
on Human Rights (1994) excluded the possibility—indicating that without exclusion the agreement 
could have been automatically considered a Common Article 3 Special Agreement. In the 2016 
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions, the International Committee of  the Red Cross names a 
number of  additional peace agreements which it views as Common Article 3 Special Agreements, 
despite the circumstance that those agreements do not state this in their text.18 They include in this 
list the Humanitarian Exchange Accord between the FARC and the Government of  Colombia 
(2004). International treaties and agreements on human rights ratified by Congress have a “priori-
ty” in domestic law (see Article 93) and a Constitutional Amendment approved by Congress on 7 
July 2016 affirmed by the Constitutional Court (18 July 2016), approved a special legislative proce-
dure for implementation of  the Peace Accords, although this was conditioned on popular 
endorsement of  the Agreement. Spoken of  in Spanish as a “legal shield,” interestingly (at least to 
myself!), public justifications of  this Common Article 3/constitutional move,19 including those of  
the government’s chief  negotiator when presenting the Agreement to the Constitutional Court20, 
articulated it self-consciously as lex pacificatoria in action—capturing the idea of  the legal status of  
the Agreement itself  as somewhere “hybrid” between international and constitutional law. Howev-
 
14 For the example of  the recent “Brexit” vote in the United Kingdom, see Brian Wheeler & Alex Hunt, Brexit: All you need to know 
about the UK leaving the EU, BBC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2016); on referenda generally, see STEPHEN TIERNEY, REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN DELIBERATION (2012). 
15 Possibly requiring only 13% of  all registered voters to vote “Yes”; see Juan Forero & Kejal Vyas, Colombian Peace Plan Heads for 
Vote, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 25, 2016, 7:06 PM). 
16 See Bell, supra note 1. 
17 See Laura Betancur Restrepo, The Legal Status of  the Colombian Peace Agreement, 110 AJIL UNBOUND 188 (2016). 
18 Commentary on Article 3: Conflicts not of  an international character, ICRC (2016).  
19 Arlene B. Tickner, Lex pacificatoria, EL ESPECTADOR (May 18, 2016, 12:14 AM).  
20 Intervención del Jefe de la Delegación del Gobierno, Humberto de la Calle, en la Corte Constitucional, PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPÚBLICA (Colom., 
May 26, 2016).  
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er, the international and constitutional status, the constitutional court judgment, and the referen-
dum result, now leave the Agreement’s legal and political status somewhat unclear.  
(3) Reciprocal commitments: Often peace agreements provide for staged reciprocal commitments 
and the Colombian Final Peace Accord uses this technique in terms of  steps to be taken by the 
parties, and through a continued dialogue process focused on implementation and producing new 
implementation commitments. The referendum itself, however, constituted one of  the commit-
ments on which others were conditioned, indicating the limitations of  this approach which can act 
as a brake on commitments the parties wish to continue to implement, as well as an enforcement 
mechanism. 
(4) Innovative peace agreement monitoring: Monitoring was to take place in a number of  ways, 
for example through reciprocity and UN involvement and an Implementation, Monitoring, Verifi-
cation, and Dispute Resolution Commission of  the Final Peace Agreement (Comisión de 
Implementación, Seguimiento y Verificación del Acuerdo Final de Paz y de Resolución de Diferencias). These are 
all fairly standard types of  monitoring mechanism for peace agreements, albeit Colombian in their 
detail. A key unique provision was that the Kroc Peace Accord Matrix, a peace agreement database 
which focuses on implementation of  comprehensive peace agreements, was to be developed and 
used to provide “in time” assessment of  implementation of  the Agreement.21 This was perhaps 
the most curious Colombian twist on the lex pax: comparative research on peace agreement im-
plementation itself  becoming an adjudicative mechanism to ensure implementation.  
Conclusion: Where to Go from here? 
Inevitably many will wonder whether the referendum and the approach to the campaign was a wise one. 
Postreferendum analysis of  reasons for the narrow “No” vote, has already pointed variously to a natural 
margin of  error (which might support a recount),22 the hurricane and low voter turn-out,23 Uribe and fellow-
traveller vested interests,24 the opposition of  groups such as Human Rights Watch,25 and the Agreement’s 
approach to gender.26   
Was It Wise to Have a Referendum?  
In peace processes, ceasefires are rarely just about ceasefires. Like the Colombian one, they often have con-
stitutional dimensions and implications. Yet these agreements are agreed primarily between those who have 
been at the heart of  the conflict including—as in this case—armed actors. The need for some sort of  broader 
public legitimacy can therefore be very high, and a referendum can seem like a useful tool for achieving it. 
The clear risk is that with so many provisions and issues, people who are opposed to just one dimension of  
the Peace Agreement can end up voting against it. In Northern Ireland the argument that people should not 
 
21 Peace Accords Matrix, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME.  
22 Michael Spagat & Neil Johnson, Colombia did not vote ‘no’ in its peace referendum—what the statistics reveal, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 4, 
2016, 2:18 PM).  
23 Clea Broadhurst, Why did Colombians reject Farc peace deal?, RFI (last modified Oct. 4, 2016, 9:15 AM).  
24 Jan Pospisil, Colombia: Don’t they want peace?, POLITICAL SETTLEMENTS RESEARCH PROGRAMME (Oct. 4, 2016).  
25 Greg Grandin, Did Human Rights Watch Sabotage Colombia’s Peace Agreement?, THE NATION (Oct. 3, 2016).  
26 Krystalli & Theidon, supra note 12.  
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“cherry-pick” the agreement was a strong campaign message for those who sought a “Yes” vote and was 
largely accepted by the voters.   
Was It Badly Timed?  
As regards timing, the Government had a difficult call to make—whether to move to a vote fast and try to 
secure a referendum quickly before any opposition to the agreement had time to mobilize and enthusiasm 
was at its height; or whether to move more slowly and build a campaign which could address doubts. Opting 
for the former now looks like a miscalculation, but the benefit of  hindsight is a wonderful thing. The peace 
process itself  had timetables for implementation built-in as necessary to the parties reaching agreement which 
had set the pace. And more time is not always a good thing where cementing of  a peace agreement is con-
cerned. Sometimes a long referendum campaign fuels discontent which moves the public away from, rather 
than towards peace. Delaying a referendum can open up a window in which “spoilers” to a peace agreement 
(on both sides) are incentivized to undertake a spectacularly violent acts which can undermine public trust 
(think the “real IRA’s” Omagh bomb a few months after the referendum in Northern Ireland). Concerns 
regarding the need to move quickly to stabilize any fragile consensus must have been uppermost in the Co-
lombian government’s minds. 
Where to Go from Here?  
The no vote does pose a clear obstacle to implementing the Final Accord, and has to be taken seriously as 
an exercise in democracy. However, while “Yes” and “No” votes were finely balanced, the clearest majority 
was that of  those who voted with their feet by not turning out. It is arguably this voice of  the “silent majori-
ty” that requires further attention. The low turnout perhaps reflected the costs of  the “slow drip” process 
which has quite literally worn people out, and exhausted their faith in peace processes.   
It is easy to oppose peace agreements on the ground that there will be a better time to make a better deal. 
Colombia’s own tortuous peace-making history indicates how this assumption is misplaced. It indicates how 
conflict dynamics tend to become more complicated and more difficult to resolve over time, rather than less 
so. Perhaps the most striking comparative lesson of  Colombia for other conflicts is that the long-term costs 
of  failure of  successive peace agreements lie not just in the risk or actuality of  a return to war, but more 
profoundly in the loss of  faith of  people in peace processes, peace agreements, and politics more generally as 
having capacity to change anything. 
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